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Abstract 
The banking system growth through capitalisations in Nigeria produced some after-effects, both salutary 
and otherwise on the other financial institutions. The major objective of this paper was to find out the 
impact of the growth of the banking system on the OFIs. It used primary and secondary data to assess the 
impact of the growth and regulation on the OFIs.  The paper adapted the Regulatory Pressure Index to 
assess the perception of regulation and supervision of the OFIs with granger causality and regressions 
and the main techniques of estimation. The results indicate that the bank growth had positively impacted 
the Primary Mortgage Institutions and the Microfinance banks while it has a negative near-significant 
effect on the Finance Houses. The results of the nine RPI objectives indicate that operators agree that 
there is inadequate supervision in the areas of capital adequacy, liquidity and products offerings of the 
OFIs. The paper concludes by recommending the change in the mode of supervision and the 
strengthening the Other Financial Institutions Department of the monetary authority or establishment of 
a new one to oversee and adequately regulate the activities of the OFIs.  
 
Keywords: Regulation, Supervision; Finance Houses; Primary Mortgage institutions Microfinance 
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1.0 Introduction 
Attention has been focused on bank financial institutions to the detriment of other financial institutions 
that make up the total bank and non-bank financial system, this, understandably with the size and the 
significant roles being played by the banks in the aggregate economy.  So much focus has been on the 
banks as if they only constitute the financial system and are in total control of the dynamics of the 
economy. This misplaced opinion has caused the issues of bank financial institutions to be considered as 
main arrow heads for the development of the economy, the empowerment and improvement of the lives 
of the people. 
 
While no doubt exists as to the role being played by the banks in the economy as far as their 
intermediation functions are concerned, the attention being focused on the sector can be detrimental to the 
performance and the effectiveness of other subsectors of the financial system, especially the non-bank 
deposit taking institutions. Also no doubt exist that when large banks fail a substantial amount of 
resources are lost and many micro units are negatively affected. The establishment of these institutions 
were for the development and the improvement of the sectors they were meant to finance. Financial 
institutions of various types exist to intermediate funds within various sectors given their level of risks 
and peculiarities. Gorton and Winton (2002) discusses the role of the institutions in the intermediating 
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process and their significance in the free market system in the saving – investment paradigm. Central 
banks in developing countries have focused on the banking system growth and distress management to 
the detriment and chagrin of other sectors. While it is understood that the economic and developmental 
efforts alone cannot be achieved by the banks, it is an established fact that the other non-bank thrift or 
deposit taking institutions have stakes in the economy and can aid the development of the potentials often 
overlooked by the deposit money banks. 
Banks generally intermediate funds between surplus and deficit units, so do the non-bank financial 
institutions (Cetorelli et al, 2012) and nothing has changed much, but for channels of delivery. The weight 
attached to the Deposit Money bank firms tends to leave the other firms out of the purview of the 
regulators, or at best not much of focus is on them in the supervision process. These institutions are 
mainly the Finance Houses (FHs), Microfinance banks (MFBs) and Primary Mortgage Institutions 
(PMIs). By the neglect or passive regulation these institutions are receiving, two effects are noticeable. 
One, the non-effectiveness of their operations and inability to achieve the desired objectives set for them 
by the financial system. This has often made them derail and shift focus to non-objectives. A second 
effect is the rampant failures regularly experienced by these institutions. The failures have led to a general 
belief that thrift institutions and other non-bank firms cannot be profitable and at the same time 
intermediate well. The long run survival and performance of these institutions will not only help the 
economy in terms of employment and other issues, but also improve the sectors they are meant to service. 
With the unwieldy structures banks have assumed during the era of universal banking, the banking firm’s 
services can be divided into approximately 25 different sections (KPMG, 2013).  Given the fact the 
universal banking seems to be out favour of most financial systems, the financial institutions acquired and 
managed by these banks are now being separated from the banks in a new wave of banking structure 
being adopted worldwide. This study becomes important at this time to enable the OFIs and non-bank 
deposit taking institutions to take firm and rooted stand and be impactful in the area of operations rather 
than being overshadowed by the banking system or rather being an appendage to them.  
The position of the banks, whether they are bank financial and bank non-financial controlled is 
established as far as credit allocation is concerned in the economy. This is mainly because of the power of 
deposit acquisition and seeming liquidity. The introduction of universal banking made the financial 
system more challenging for non-banking markets as banks could not directly differentiate between 
carving niches and specialising, preferring to open up in all markets. The main segments of universal 
banking being insurance, securities and retail banking were fully operated by the banks in spite of 
insufficient of resources to cater for the risks being encountered in each of the sectors. Thus an average 
bank opened or acquired a Primary Mortgage Institutions (PMIs), a capital market arm, an insurance firm 
and still remained a bank.  
The role being performed by the other financial institutions (OFIs) is apposite when the economy is 
developing and a larger percentage of the people are poor as subsist in many developing countries. The 
OFIs are known to be particularly useful for supplementing the role of the banks, create more competitive 
environment in the financial system and generally make the banks more efficient (Shrestha, 2007). The 
role of the OFIs have increased with the growing pension sector that is aggregating funds at an high rate 
though the market is immature in the very sense of the word. The market for financial products by the 
consumers is also growing. These are the areas where the OFIs should remain vibrant and strong, but 
these areas have been taken over by the banks. The main areas of the banks should rather be the corporate 
sectors and small and medium enterprises.  Sellon (1992) emphasises the role of the pension and mutual 
funds in the delivery of the financial services given their seeming closeness to the people. 
The main objective of this paper is to discover the relevance of the OFIs within the current structure and 
framework and the need to bring adequate regulation and supervision that has been made available to the 
banks in order to fulfil the role expected of them. To do this, the paper is divided into five sections. 
Following after this introduction is a brief review of the significance of OFIs, regulation and other issues. 
The third section centres on measurement of the variables used and methodology and the fourth is on the 
discussion of results and the expected impacts while the final section concludes the paper with 
recommendations.  
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2.0 Literature on Significance of Thrift Institutions  
A complex vortex of policies and actions bring financial intermediation to a point where the dynamics 
regularly introduce new paradigms into the financial system. The role of financial intermediation is being 
regularly redefined with continuous changes to a section or many sections of the finance industry. Earlier 
theories have argued the importance of either money or credit in the growth of the economy through 
financial market intermediation Levine (2000) believes there are four sides to which an economy 
development may tilt, one being the financial services. 
 
The competition existing between banks and other financial firms has reached a height that banks over the 
years have become weaker in most developed economies. Beim (1992) argues that traditional banks are 
dying while the other financial institutions are becoming stronger, more relevant and undercutting the 
banking firms businesses. For instance, shadow banking is a becoming more significant than before. This 
was followed by counterarguments by Kaufman and Mote (1994). Somehow the other financial 
institutions (Thrift Institutions in the US) have grown stronger and are able to completely compete with 
the Banks offering services more readily and cheaply. Two institutions particularly analogous to those of 
the Nigerian financial environment: the finance houses and primary mortgage institutions both providing 
consumer finance and mortgages services respectively.   
  
OFIs are all involved in intermediary role in finance and are purportedly closer to the households from 
whom much of the savings in the financial system come from. Over the years, through regulatory capital 
increases and capital adequacy policies, banks have suddenly grown to emasculate other financial 
institutions and have taken over the services rendered by these institutions. The bulk of domestic savings 
come from the various economic units particularly the households and Levine et al (2000) prove that 
OFIs contributes to domestic economic development of their respective countries. In most developed 
countries traditional banking has been on the decline which emphasises the leading and important role for 
OFIs. Edwards and Mishkin (1995) prove the importance of the TSIs in the United States over the 
traditional banking system and calls for their regulation to be stepped up. While the entrance of banking 
firms into the trading market through the universal banking system has produced risks and instability, the 
engagement of OFIs in the provision of services traditionally and conventionally undertaken by them 
enable them to develop business practices that suit the environment they service. Boot and Ratnoviski 
(2013) conclude that universal banking was inherently and dynamically risky for the banks by veering 
into trading activities as a result of the available short term opportunities. 
 
The vista of opportunities available to the OFIs to engage in consumer finance efforts is dimmed by the 
bigger banks that have seized the domestic financial market to maximise their investment. The OFIs can 
compete effectively against the Banks by introducing financial products with lower cost for the welfare of 
the population, subject to the regulators’ approval.  Lovati (1975) had brought out the products in which 
the Banks were dominant and the opportunities available for the OFIs to exploit and compete effectively 
with the Banks. The banks generally are disadvantaged in the pricing of products because of their 
expensive profile and other requirements. Reserve requirements of the Banks are rigorously implemented 
unlike the OFIs. Also, the OFIs can offer products that bring in cheapest sources of funds in form. 
Primary Mortgage Institutions (PMIs), Microfinance Banks (MFBs), Discount and Finance Houses (FHs) 
all have similar products that can compete with the conventional current accounts of the banks. The OFIs 
also have the advantage of personal touch at lower levels of the economically active persons. 
Regulation as a key issue in the financial services industry constitutes a barrier to entry. Both the banks 
and other financial institutions are regulated since their instrument of trade is the wealth of the people. 
While most economies have devolved the regulation to a single regulator or a modified form of it and not 
directly linked with the monetary authorities, the Nigerian economy still practises multiple regulators 
with central bank as the leading authority. Adetiloye (2008) calls for the adoption of regulation separated 
from the monetary authority using a modified form of single financial regulation. There are contentions 
that banks are overregulated making their services expensive, while issues of “Too big to fail banks” 
(TBTF) that survive on public sustenance rage on (Moosa, 2010). An attempt to increase the Tier 1 equity 
requirements of the PMIs is being seen with the effect to reduce the number of participating firms. 
Much unlike Nigeria, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) deals with the supervision and regulation of 
Thrift Institutions. It basic functions span the registration and ensuring that they follow laid down 
guidelines and fair competition. The Financial Services Authority (FSA) in United Kingdom as a single 
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financial system regulator concerns itself with products fairness, pricing in the financial system and 
consumer protection while at the same time ensuring that the system is not available to those who would 
want to use it to perpetrate crime or commit fraud (Brauilt, 2002). Various reports have cited that less 
than half OFIs render returns (The Guardian, 2008) after being brought into the audit of the Central bank 
(The Punch 2009) and with explicit deposit insurance from the Nigerian deposit insurance corporation 
(The Punch, 2007).  This has not changed much (NDIC, 2012). 
The conclusion is that while the OFIs are expected to increase in significance and the banks dwindle in 
influence, the banks have rather increased in power. The issue bring to fore the role of financial 
intermediaries in the economy, with the early belief that they are value creating and reduce costs. The 
gamut of regulations and dynamics of the financial system and market especially with the developments 
in information technology, deregulation, deepening of financial markets, tending to reduce transaction 
costs and information asymmetries, financial intermediation theory may come to the conclusion of 
irrelevance in the financial markets (Scholtens and van Wensveenshall, 2003).  Vittas (1995) concludes 
that active  peer monitoring and enforcement of contractual obligations are the best way forward if the 
other financial intermediaries must survive and thrive in the developing world. 
The Nigeria scenario of OFIs shows that the investors have always moved to benefit from loosely 
regulated financial environments that have always ended up with the clients in these firms losing their 
deposit or investments. At different times as revealed by Figures 1 and 2 many of these institutions that 
were established have closed down with depositors sustaining losses. The heights of FHs and PMIs were 
in 1993 - 1996. These have tended to draw people close to the banking firms where ostensible deposit 
insurance subsists. The banks investment in the MFBs and PMIs are not significant enough to draw 
inference that their involvement has had positive effect on this set of OFIs. Two banks have wholly 
owned MFBs subsidiaries while seven other MFBs have investment of less than 30% from the Banks 
(NDIC, 2010). The OFIs are supervised by a section in the CBN that collates reports that are submitted 
for analysis as to performance. This seems to be where the whole exercise ends.  
3.0 Methodology 
The paper adopts a twofold technique to deal with the issue of impact perception and regulation 
challenges of the OFIs. A primary data was obtained using the metrics developed by KPMG (2013). Nine 
of the ten metrics were adapted to be tested in the case of the OFIs, though they were originally meant for 
the Deposit money banks. The Regulatory Pressure Index (RPI) as measurements was used to assess the 
regulatory impacts on the banking system in consideration of the improvements that have come into the 
system. Though, all the reference points have not been adopted by the CBN for the banking system, its 
use in this paper ensures that a global standard is used to measure financial institutions. It becomes useful 
especially to measure the perceptions of the operators’ of the supervisory and regulatory functions 
expected to be performed by in the running of the firms. 
A proper comparison of the stance of the banks requires a measurement of the banks regulatory impact 
using the above metrics. Four banks were selected at random as a sample of the 21 in the banking system 
to act as proxy for the system. Two of the banks were established in the post-Structural Adjustment 
Programme of 1986, while the other two were established before 1952. The mean difference using t test 
for the bank produced a result of 4.065. This was used further on in the test for each of the OFIs. 
The primary data consist of the Likert scale questionnaire ranging on scale of 5 to 1. The questionnaires 
were distributed to the available members of the OFIs and the managers of the branches of these 
institutions that could be accessed on a convenient sampling basis. The number of OFIs covered was 3 
namely, the primary mortgage institutions, finance houses and Microfinance banks. Appendix 1 shows 
the different OFIs and the total capitalisation in comparison with the banks. The questionnaire is to the 
intent of the operators’ perception of the adequacy of supervision of the OFIs.  
The metrics are: 
Table 1 Regulatory Pressure Index 
 Reforms Objectives 
1 Capital Increase both the quantity  and quality of capital buffers in order to 
reduce the possibility  of failures 
2 Liquidity Ensure that financial institutions have enough liquid assets to meet a 
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potential run on funds. 
3 Products offering   Reduce risks to financial stability, from the structure of the financial 
services sector or the failure of a systemically important financial 
institution. 
4 Supervision Ensure that OFIs are properly supervised, proportionately to the nature, 
size and complexity of their business. 
5 Board Competence Ensure that Boards have sufficient skills, experience and availability to 
assume full accountability for the decisions taken by the organization. 
6 Remuneration Regulate excessive  remuneration practices 
7 Customer Treatment Protect the customer, help the customer make informed investment 
decisions and ensure that the products sold to the customer suit his/her 
investment profile. 
8 Quality of Financials Ensure that Accounts presented are reliable and can be compared across 
industry. 
9 Accounting and 
Disclosure 
Objectives 
Consider whether accounting policies need to be revised and the 
additional disclosures that may be required 
Move to expected loss provisioning. 
Source: Adapted from KPMG (2013)  
The second stream of data is secondary and sourced from the Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin 
2012.They are the numbers of other financial institutions reporting, the assets of the institutions in each 
category and thereby their growth rate was established. This is presented in the appendix. The techniques 
of estimation of the secondary data are granger causality and vector autoregressive processes. This is to 
show that massive growth of the banks and its impact on other financial institutions. 
Table 2 
Questionnaire Distribution and Retrieval 
Institutions Banks Primary Mortgage Inst. Microfinance Banks Finance Houses 
Average 
Reporting 
21 % 98 % 823 % 104 % 
No Served 6 28.57 35 35.71 35 4.25 32 30.77 
No 
Retrieved 
4 19.04 35 35.71 33 4 30 28.84 
Source: Authors’ Questionnaire Distribution 
The variables are first correlated to discover the relationships between them. Then granger causality is 
adopted to measure the causality of dwindling fortunes of the OFIs. Causality relates to the ability of one 
variable to predict the (and therefore cause) the other (Asteriou and Hall, 2011). Granger (1969; 1986) 
developed a VAR model that expresses both unidirectional and bi-directional feedback relationship 
between two variables tY  and tX .  
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yte  and xte  are uncorrelated error terms. The direction of causality of tY  and tX  could results 
in any of four causes: bi-directional causality and a unidirectional pairwise causality (Asteriou and Hall, 
2011). To obtain a fit we test with the normal Wald F- statistic on coefficient restriction as follows: 
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Which follows the Fm,n-k distribution and K = m+n+1. Should the computed F-value exceed the F-critical 
value, the null hypothesis is rejected and concludes that tX   cause tY . Rssu and RssR represents sum of 
squared residual from the unrestricted and restricted equations respectively. Since causality results are not 
signed the need to introduce a superior technique becomes important to see the signs of the results and 
impact of the independents on the dependent variables. To estimate the impact of the growth of Bank 
assets on the OFIs institutions we estimate a regression with the variables measured in percentages as 
growth of the assets in current year over the next i.e.  %ΔX = (X2 - X1)/X1 
where:  Bankgrwt is growth in the banks’ assets; same for the PMIs, MFBs, FHs 
4.0 Results and Discussions 
The results are set out beginning with correlations indicating relationships, causality and regressions. 
Thus the results indicate the degree of relationships and impacts of the various financial institutions one 
against the other. In this order banks growth predominance and impact on the growth of the OFIs 
becomes plausible to accept. 
 
  BAKGRWT FINGRWT MFBGRWT PMIGRWT BANKASST 
 Mean  45.77911  52.84834  37.31285 -59.8245  5786246. 
 Median  32.58166  9.992105  16.13446 -13.4606  2766880. 
 Maximum  328.2609  589.4760  207.5224  23.19566  19396634 
 Minimum -14.0623 -140.7368 -52.05387 -580.484  226162.0 
 Std. Dev.  70.97014  147.6736  60.95893  140.8170  6808557. 
 Skewness  3.528629  2.615866  1.234222 -2.95679  1.023324 
 Kurtosis  14.76812  10.45609  4.532318  11.14127  2.412000 
            
 Jarque-Bera  149.0658  65.68005  6.682631  80.15679  3.589824 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.035390  0.000000  0.166142 
            
 Sum  869.8030  1004.118  708.9441 -1136.67  1.10E+08 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  90661.69  392534.9  66887.85  356929.6  8.34E+14 
            
 Observations  19  19  19  19  19 
 
4.1 Correlations Results 
One very important observation of the result is the fact that the correlation of the average size of the each 
of the institutions does not have any relationship apart from the Finance houses and the banks. The 
finance firms had grown considerably in the early 1990s. With the correlation matrix in Table 3, there is 
only one significant relationship as expressed between the pair of microfinance banks and the PMIs which 
is negative at r -0.6.  Other relationships are as low as r 0.077 for PMIs and Banks growth. However, the 
relationships are all show positive though insignificant. This is expected as a result of the money supply 
and economic growth. A noteworthy observation in the results is the negative signs that most of the rs 
have in the pairs with the Bankasst variable except for the PMIs. The relationship is negative for the 
Microfinance and Finance houses subsector with rs of.-189 and.-105 respectively.  A fair inference on 
this is that the growth of banks assets has somehow has negative relationship with the other financial 
institutions in the financial system. 
 Table 3 Correlations between the Variables 
 BankGrwt PMIGrwt Finhgrwt Mfbgwt Bankasst 
BankGrwt Pearson Correlation 1     
Sig. (2-tailed)      
N 20     
PMIGrwt Pearson Correlation .077 1    
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Sig. (2-tailed) .755     
N 19 20    
Finhgrwt Pearson Correlation -.098 .149 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .681 .529    
N 20 20 21   
Mfbgwt Pearson Correlation .416 -.600** .052 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .077 .007 .831   
N 19 19 19 19  
Bankasst Pearson Correlation -.057 .151 -.189 -.105 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .813 .537 .426 .670  
N 20 19 20 19 20 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Source: Authors  Output of data 
 
4.2 Granger Causality Results 
The significant Wald statistics for each of the pair of variables is indicated by the p values and are 
flagged.  The results show that there is significant bi-directional relationship between bank assets and 
PMIs growth. The reason for this obvious as most of the Banks have acquired or invested heavily in PMIs 
in the bid to diversify their assets and invest their seeming surplus equity from the capitalisation exercise 
concluded in 2006. Single direction causality is observed between the Finance Houses and banks on one 
hand and bank assets and Finance House on the other. Also, the result of the causality between finance 
houses and PMIs is also significant. This relationship is bi-directional. While the result may indicate that 
the growth of one causes the other it may also indicate the fact the growth of one impact negatively 
against the other. The market situation between the PMIs and Finance houses in Nigeria show that the 
two, though different largely by nomenclature, invariably operate in the same market, with the PMIs 
offering products and services where the Finance house should predominate. PMIs selectively sell and 
their mortgage products with care avoiding possible default risk. The basic reason adduced for this 
scenario is the perennial and traditional problem of liquidity affecting the sub-sector. 
Table 4 
Abridged Granger Causality Results (Significant Results are in Bold) 
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
    
    
    
  FINGRWT does not Granger Cause BAKGRWT 17  0.21713  0.80792 
  BAKGRWT does not Granger Cause FINGRWT  3.92026  0.04895 
    
    
  FINGRWT does not Granger Cause  BANKASST 17  23.8776  6.6E-05 
  BANKASST does not Granger Cause FINGRWT  2.20972  0.15238 
    
 +++++++
+++++++
+++++++
+++++++
+++++++
+++++++
+++++++
+++++++
+++++++
+ 
  
  PMIGRWT does not Granger Cause BANKASST 17  6.51333  0.01215 
  BANKASST does not Granger Cause PMIGRWT  5.31101  0.02228 
    
    
    
  PMIGRWT does not Granger Cause CMFBGRWT 17  0.16863  0.84679 
  CMFBGRWT does not Granger Cause PMIGRWT  0.11725  0.89037 
    
    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         17 31.5105 1.7E-05
  FINGRWT does not Granger Cause PMIGRWT  7.54107  0.00757 
    
    
Source: Authors Output of the Variables 
 
4.3 Regressions Results 
The results show in all cases the PMIs have benefitted from the growth in banking assets and the growth 
in the banking subsector. This relationship is clearly adduced to banks’ ownership and investment in 
some of the PMIs. The relationship is strong in this regression and significant beyond 0.05 level. The case 
Pensee Journal Vol 76, No. 8;Aug 2014
377 office@penseejournal.com
 
of the Microfinance banks show positive too at a much higher level of significance at 0.01. The reasons 
for this are clear, though MFBs are competing with the banks though not at the same level, the rate of 
growth of the MFBs have been astronomical, as the investors in the banking system elect to invest in the 
sector since capital requirement of the regular banks have become difficult to meet. Figure 2 also show 
the rate of growth of the MFBs in unwieldy manner. The FHs result is not so significant. With the t at -
1.217 it cannot be ignored as it is close to 0.1 level of significance. The FHs have been losing out in the 
growth of the banks within the financial system. The obvious reasons for this can be attributed to the loss 
of deposits as well as products in the financial market to the commercial banks. The consumer finance 
market has been taken over to a large extent by the banks. A cause of the problem could be lack of 
deposits (placements) insurance for deposits with the FHs. 
Table 5: Regression Coefficients  Results  
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 44.853 23.364  1.920 .076   
PMIGrwt .306 .136 .607 2.259 .040** .586 1.706 
Mfbgrwt .909 .305 .781 2.978 .010*** .617 1.621 
FinHgrwt -.080 .065 -.266 -1.217 .244 .886 1.128 
Bankasst -1.351E-6 .000 -.130 -.604 .556 .921 1.086 
Dependent Variable: BankGrwt 
Source: Authors’ Output of Variables 
 
The regression results help to see the impacts of the growth of the banks in each case of the OFIs. While 
it has been negative entirely for the FHs it has been helpful to the PMIs while it cannot be ignored in the 
growth of the MFBs. The banks growth over the years was induced mainly by the continuous increases in 
regulatory Tier 1 capital especially in the period of 2005- 2006. The effects continued till 2008 when the 
assets of the affected institutions either were positively or negatively affected. Figure 2 shows the 
increase or growth in the assets of each of the institutions against the growth in the banks’ assets. The 
results for the FHs by regression is insignificantly negative, however the VAR results with 2 year lag and 
with Bank assets and growth rates (Table 2 in the Appendices) prove that the impact of the growth of the 
banks has been adverse against the FHs.   
4.4 Primary Data Results 
The secondary data reveals that the monetary authorities have not done so much for the OFIs sector, 
concentrating on the bank finance sector. The metrics for various RPI objectives shows dismal negative 
values with the average for the FHs recording the highest negative t values and overall average of t -
13.41 with its highest of t -23.18 in disclosure objectives. From every indication they are not supervised 
in this area. Its best (least) negative result is the areas of customer satisfaction which of course shows 
that they are have developed close relations with many of the clients or customers while many have 
switched over to the banks for patronage. Capital adequacy is next in term of supervision with t -19.04 
indicating that they are not regulated in this area. The mean difference of the data is more revealing 
because of the adopted Banks metric and mean difference of 4.065. From this mean disclosure 
objectives is highest with -2.589 followed by adequate supervision -2.446. Operators here believe they 
are not adequately supervised or regulated.  
 
The MFBs record a slightly better output with the negative t averaging at t -10.1. It has the least 
negative t (best result) in customer satisfaction with t -5.2 and its worst result in the product offerings 
with t -17.1. This shows there is lack of imagination in their product offerings. Remunerations control is 
the next poorest at t -11.5 which indicates that there are few controls on earning of officials. It is hardly 
surprising that board competence records a second lowest t of -5.65 with the ownership of MFBs 
coming mainly from the retired bankers and persons who could not obtain license to operate banks due 
to the capital requirements barrier.  The means difference for each of the objectives is also slightly better 
than the FHs. The average mean of -1.52 is better than the FHs at -2.589. This is where the bank 
measures 4.065. 
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The PMIs seem to have the best results somehow, and show that the regulation perception of the RPI 
objectives measure better on the average t with -7.6. It is worst result is in liquidity with t of -14.8 and 
next worst is product offering with -13.3 followed by disclosure objectives with t of -9.53. It is clear that 
the perception of the operators concerning the observation cannot be more correct since the liquidity 
crises which the subsector can face if not carefully managed can engulf the subsector. This is perhaps 
why the product offering is poor: most PMIs compete outside their main area of providing mortgage 
finance and other similar services. The mean result of the PMIs shows an average of -1.61. This is slightly 
close to the MFBs. Means difference show that the customer satisfaction is perhaps best in the PMIs with 
the lowest -0.792. Financial record quality and capital adequacy is next with -1.065. The worst result is 
shown by liquidity and product offerings with means of -2.52 and -2.383 respectively. Overall the PMIs 
results seem to respond to better interaction with regulators. 
    Table 6 Abridged Results of One Sample t test for the three OFIs 
  Finance House Microfinance Banks 
Primary Mortgage 
Institutions 
Objectives 
T Df 
Sig. 
(2-
taile
d) 
Mean 
Differe
nce 
t Df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Differe
nce 
t Df 
Sig. 
(2-
taile
d) 
Mean 
Differen
ce   
CAPADQ -19.04 29 0 -2.398 -10 32 0 -2.429 
-
4.33 
34 0 -1.065 
LDTY -11.12 29 0 -2.208 -10.2 32 0 -2.474 
-
14.8 
34 0 -2.52 
PRDTFRG -14.47 29 0 -2.113 -17.1 32 0 -2.792 
-
13.3 
34 0 -2.383 
ADQTSPVN -13.93 29 0 -2.446 -10.5 32 0 -2.292 
-
7.96 
34 0 -1.701 
BRDCPCE -6.336 29 0 -1.113 -5.65 32 0 -1.565 
-
3.51 
34 0.002 -1.02 
RNMTN -13.79 29 0 -2.255 -11.5 32 0 -2.474 
-
8.05 
34 0 -1.974 
DSFDCST -6.299 29 0 -0.684 -5.2 32 0 -1.52 
-
2.91 
34 0.008 -0.792 
FNRQLT -12.49 29 0 -2.017 -9.79 32 0 -2.338 
-
4.05 
34 0.001 -1.065 
DSCOBJ -23.18 29 0 -2.589 -11.4 32 0 -2.565 
-
9.53 
34 0 -1.974 
 
Source:  Summary Results of Primary Data Collected by the authors (2013): Test Value for Banks = 4.065 
 
5.0 Recommendations and Conclusions 
One observation of the whole study is that little attention is paid to the OFIs with much attention being 
paid the banks.  The OFIs therefore need adequate attention from the regulators. It behoves on the 
authorities to ensure that the level of soundness that exist in the banking system be transmitted to the 
OFIs for the smooth running of the financial markets. With this observation it may not be possible for the 
Other Financial Institutions Department (OFID) of the Central Bank of Nigeria as presently constituted to 
perform the regulatory functions. The department should either be reconstituted or be taken up by another 
separate regulator for better and more effective performance of the sector. 
 
It is clear that liquidity is a key issue in the OFIs from the results and the perception of the operators. The 
problem can be overcome by increase in equity capital requirements of the institutions in each sub-sector. 
With an increased equity capital the institutions can be more confident in the market and can have 
cushion for risks that are undertaken. This will also bring confidence to the system for customers and 
clients to patronise them with no fear of losing their deposits or placements. The downside effect of this 
would be the reduction of numbers of operators. When raising capital becomes difficult it may be more 
sensible for the banks to acquire these firms, especially the FHs where any value can be obtained. With 
the new structure being implemented in the banking industry, OFIs, especially the FHs face bleak future 
if nothing is done. 
Products offerings and disclosure are the other key areas that the OFIs need to improve on. Each firm 
must improve on products offerings and must be innovative to bring back the clients and customers that 
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patronised them before the banking boom episode of 2004 - 2006. Sustainability of products offering can 
be ensured by adequate and close-marking regulation. The products must be market friendly for it to 
succeed. If, in Nigeria, banks have taken over the financial system through the acquisition of other 
financial institutions and the regulators of the other financial institutions seem powerless to change 
fortunes of the firms, then it is death to the FHs. 
The paper has investigated the effects of the growth in the banking industry in Nigeria on the OFIs. It is 
clear that that increase in capital during a universal banking regime can have the effect of   allowing 
banks to invest into other financial institutions. The effects have been both negative and positive on the 
Finance Houses, Primary Mortgage institutions and Microfinance subsectors. The impact on the Finance 
Houses has been negative as the Banks began to offer and sell products where the finance houses have 
been predominant before. There is also evidence that regulators and supervisors have not done much in 
the OFIs as the perception by operators show. The particular areas identified are capital adequacy, 
liquidity and products offerings. All these need to be improved. These would improve the OFIs subsector 
and the financial system in general.  
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APPENDICES 
Table 1Numbers of other financial Institutions and Total and Average Assets 
  
Primary Mortgage 
Institutions Microfinance Banks Finance Houses 
Years 
Total 
Asset ₦m No 
Ave 
Asset ₦m 
Total 
Asset ₦m No 
Ave Asset 
₦m 
Total 
Asset ₦m No 
Ave Asset 
₦m 
1992 2243.2 145 15.47034 967 334 2.895209581 2446 618 3.957928803 
1993 3610.7 252 14.32817 3198.6 611 5.23502455 13386 310 43.18064516 
1994 3070.3 279 11.00466 4693 902 5.202882483 11660 290 40.20689655 
1995 2951.8 279 10.57993 4106 745 5.511409396 11266 279 40.37992832 
1996 4388.6 278 15.78633 4432 693 6.395382395 8940 279 32.04301075 
1997 6078.9 115 52.86 4706 674 6.982195846 12059 270 44.66296296 
1998 6593.2 115 57.33217 6477.2 552 11.73405797 8213 279 29.43727599 
1999 7856.3 115 68.31565 8903.6 550 16.18836364 8941.7 279 32.04910394 
2000 7124.7 71 100.3479 12014.7 881 13.63757094 7871.3 280 28.11178571 
2001 7982.7 80 99.78375 4884.4 747 6.538688086 12903.5 98 131.6683673 
2002 55000 81 679.0123 15463 769 20.10793238 11685 102 114.5588235 
2003 64400 81 795.0617 28689 774 37.06589147 29607 104 284.6826923 
2004 81200 83 978.3133 34162 753 45.36786189 34508 107 322.5046729 
2005 99900 90 1110 82886 757 109.4927345 37460.6 112 334.4696429 
2006 114454 91 1257.736 55145.8 750 73.52773333 54339 112 485.1696429 
2007 302278 93 3250.301 75549.8 709 106.5582511 65804.65 112 587.5415179 
2008 329591.5 82 4019.409 122338.9 733 166.9016371 134180 114 1177.017544 
2009 329613 98 3363.398 151610 828 183.1038647 118136 114 1036.280702 
2010 358809 102 3517.735 170330 801 212.6466916 113781.6 114 998.0842105 
2011 342136.1 102 3354.275 190721.2 821 232.3035323 114920.7 114 1008.076316 
Source: Derived Variables from CBN’s Statistical Bulletin 2012 
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Figure 1 Relationship between the Growth in Finance Houses, Microfinance Banks and PMIs 
 
Source : Authors’ calculations  as adpated from CBN Statistical Bulletin (2012) 
 
Figure 2   No of Financial Institutions in the System 1991- 2011  
 
Source:  Abstracted from CBN Statistical Bulletin 
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